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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Eric Andrews is serving a 312-year sentence for 
committing a series of armed robberies when he was nineteen. 
After Congress enacted the First Step Act, Andrews filed a 
compassionate-release motion and argued that his case 




a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We 
will affirm the District Court’s denial of Andrews’s motion.  
I 
During a one-month period in 2005, Eric Andrews and 
a group of his confederates robbed thirteen North Philadelphia 
businesses at gunpoint. Andrews was charged with the thirteen 
robberies, conspiring to commit the robberies, and brandishing 
a firearm during the completed crimes. After trial, a jury found 
Andrews guilty on all counts and he was sentenced to 312 
years’ imprisonment: 57 months for his role in the robberies 
and conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and 3,684 months for 
brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c). Andrews received such an elevated sentence 
in large part because, at the time, each additional § 924(c) 
count carried a 25-year mandatory minimum. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (2006) (amended by First Step Act of 2018, 
Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5221–22).1 
In 2018, Congress changed that by passing the First 
Step Act. The Act revised § 924(c) so that the 25-year 
mandatory minimum for subsequent offenses would not apply 
unless the defendant already had a final conviction for a 
§ 924(c) charge at the time of the offense. See First Step Act 
§ 403(a); United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2324 n.1 
(2019) (“[O]nly a second § 924(c) violation committed ‘after a 
prior [§ 924(c)] conviction . . . has become final’ will trigger 
 
1 At the time Andrews was sentenced, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 
provided that “[i]n the case of a second or subsequent 
conviction under this subsection, the person shall . . . be 
sentenced to a term of not less than 25 years.” 18 U.S.C. 




the 25-year minimum.”). Had Andrews been sentenced today, 
his consecutive convictions for brandishing a firearm would 
each generate a statutory minimum of 7 years, resulting in a 
91-year sentence. But Congress specifically chose not to apply 
the statutory change to people who had already been sentenced 
under the old version: “This section, and the amendments made 
by this section, shall apply to any offense that was committed 
before the date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the 
offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment.” 
Id. § 403(b). Because Andrews was sentenced in 2006, he 
could not receive a reduced sentence under the new sentencing 
scheme. See United States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 
2020) (“[T]he new § 924(c) mandatory minimum does not 
apply to defendants initially sentenced before the First Step 
Act’s enactment.”). 
However, Andrews was still able to move for a modified 
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He was able to do 
so because of another innovation of the First Step Act—
prisoner-initiated motions for compassionate release. See First 
Step Act § 603(b). Previously, all motions for compassionate 
release had to be made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. 
But the First Step Act created an avenue for prisoners to file 
their own motions in federal court. Id. 
The First Step Act added the procedure for prisoner-
initiated motions while leaving the rest of the compassionate-
release framework unchanged. So just like Bureau-initiated 
motions, a prisoner’s motion may be granted if the court finds 
that the sentence reduction is (1) warranted by “extraordinary 
and compelling reasons”; (2) “consistent with applicable 
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”; and 




U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent they are applicable. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). 
In support of his motion, Andrews pointed to the recent 
changes to the § 924(c) mandatory minimums and the duration 
of his sentence. He also noted his rehabilitation in prison, his 
relatively young age at the time of his offense, the 
government’s decision to charge him with thirteen § 924(c) 
counts,2 and his alleged susceptibility to COVID-19. Andrews 
claimed that, together, those six reasons were extraordinary 
and compelling under the compassionate-release statute.  
Before the District Court could consider whether the 
proposed reasons collectively satisfied the extraordinary-and-
compelling requirement it first had to determine what 
“extraordinary and compelling” meant under 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The government claimed that the court was 
bound by a Commission policy statement describing 
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” as: (1) medical 
conditions, (2) complications in old age, (3) family 
circumstances, and (4) “other reasons” as determined by the 
Director of the Bureau of Prisons. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines 
Manual § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018). The 
court disagreed, concluding that, by its terms, the policy 
statement applied only to Bureau-initiated motions. United 
 
2 Andrews claims that the government’s decision to charge him 
with thirteen § 924(c) counts was an abuse of prosecutorial 
discretion in two ways: (1) consecutive § 924(c) counts were 
disproportionally used against black men like Andrews; and 
(2) he was sentenced much more severely than his co-
defendants who cooperated and pleaded guilty, effectively 
making his 312-year sentence a punishment for exercising his 




States v. Andrews, 480 F. Supp. 3d 669, 676 (E.D. Pa. 2020). 
Indeed, the policy statement begins with the words “[u]pon 
motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,” U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.13, and its commentary specifically states that a 
“reduction under this policy statement may be granted only 
upon motion by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,” id. 
§ 1B1.13 cmt. n.4 (emphasis added). The court thus concluded 
that the policy statement was “inapplicable” to prisoner-
initiated motions. Andrews, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 677. As a result, 
the court concluded that it was free to interpret “extraordinary 
and compelling” for itself and consider reasons beyond the four 
categories listed in the policy statement. Id. 
Even so, the District Court noted that its inquiry was not 
boundless. The inapplicability of the policy statement did not 
mean, for example, that all of Andrews’s proposed reasons fell 
within the statutory meaning of “extraordinary and 
compelling.” The court concluded that two of the proposed 
reasons—the duration of Andrews’s sentence and the 
nonretroactive changes to mandatory minimums—could not be 
extraordinary and compelling as a matter of law. Id. at 678–80. 
The court also concluded that, although it was not bound by the 
policy statement, the policy statement could still provide 
helpful guidance in determining what constitutes extraordinary 
and compelling reasons. Id. at 683–84. So, utilizing the text, 
dictionary definitions, the policy statement,3 and existing 
precedent, the court determined that Andrews’s four remaining 
reasons collectively fell short of being extraordinary and 
 
3 In interpreting the policy statement, the court also considered 
a program statement promulgated by the Bureau of Prisons. 




compelling under the statute. Id. at 682–88. Andrews timely 
appealed.  
II 
 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. We exercise de novo review over the District Court’s 
interpretation of statutes and policy statements. See Gibbs v. 
Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 964 (3d Cir. 1998). But a grant of 
compassionate release is a purely discretionary decision. 
United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020). 
We therefore review a district court’s decision to deny a 
compassionate-release motion for abuse of discretion. Id. 
Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, we will not disturb the 
court’s determination unless we are left with “a definite and 
firm conviction that [it] committed a clear error of judgment in 
the conclusion it reached.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 
234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
III 
A 
The first issue is whether the District Court was bound 
by the Commission’s policy statement. We conclude that it was 
not.  
As the District Court noted, the text of the policy 
statement explicitly limits its application to Bureau-initiated 




policy statement4 is not applicable—and not binding—for 
courts considering prisoner-initiated motions. In reaching this 
conclusion, we align with nearly every circuit court to consider 
the issue. See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 235 (2d 
Cir. 2020); United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 282 (4th Cir. 
2020); United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 
2021); United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519–20 (6th Cir. 
2021); United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180–81 (7th 
Cir. 2020); United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 
2021); United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1050 (10th Cir. 
2021); United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342, 355 (D.C. Cir. 
2021). But see United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1247–
48 (11th Cir. 2021).  
 
4 Under the compassionate-release statute, all sentence 
reductions must be “consistent with applicable policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). More specifically, Congress has directed the 
Sentencing Commission to issue general policy statements 
“describ[ing] what should be considered extraordinary and 
compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the 
criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(t). But the Commission has not yet promulgated a post–
First Step Act policy statement describing what should be 
extraordinary and compelling in the context of prisoner-
initiated motions. Though vexing, that temporary anomaly 
does not authorize this Court to effectively update the 
Commission’s extant policy statement by ignoring the pre-First 
Step Act language relating to Bureau-initiated motions. See 





That leads us to the second issue: whether, in 
interpreting and applying the phrase “extraordinary and 
compelling reasons,” the District Court erred. We conclude 
that it did not.  
1 
To start, the District Court did not err when it consulted 
the text, dictionary definitions, and the policy statement to 
form a working definition of “extraordinary and compelling 
reasons.” Given that the compassionate-release statute does not 
define “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” the court 
looked to those resources to give shape to the otherwise 
amorphous phrase. That was not error. “We look to dictionary 
definitions to determine the ordinary meaning of a word . . . 
with reference to its statutory text.” Bonkowski v. Oberg Indus., 
Inc., 787 F.3d 190, 200 (3d Cir. 2015). And courts may 
consider an extrinsic source like the policy statement if, like 
here, it “shed[s] a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s 
understanding of [an] otherwise ambiguous term[].” Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 
(2005). 
But Andrews claims that, because the policy statement 
is not binding on prisoner-initiated motions, the court had no 
business looking to it for guidance on the meaning of 
“extraordinary and compelling reasons.” We disagree. The 
court correctly recognized that although the policy statement is 
no longer binding, it still sheds light on the meaning of 
extraordinary and compelling reasons. “It is a commonplace of 
statutory interpretation that ‘Congress legislates against the 




v. Newton, 139 S. Ct. 1881, 1890 (2019) (quoting McQuiggin 
v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 398 n.3 (2013)). Because Congress 
reenacted the compassionate-release statute without any 
alterations to the phrase “extraordinary and compelling 
reasons,” it was reasonable for the court to conclude that the 
phrase largely retained the meaning it had under the previous 
version of the statute. See United States v. Johnson, 948 F.3d 
612, 619 (3d Cir. 2020); see also Antonin Scalia & Brian A. 
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 322 
(2012) (“The clearest application of the prior-construction 
canon occurs with reenactments: If a word or phrase . . . has 
been given a uniform interpretation by inferior courts or the 
responsible agency, a later version of that act perpetuating the 
wording is presumed to carry forward that interpretation.”). 
Moreover, the District Court looked to the policy 
statement’s descriptions of extraordinary and compelling 
circumstances as a guide, not as an ultimate binding authority. 
See Andrews, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 682–84. That is not error. The 
policy statement’s descriptions of extraordinary and 
compelling circumstances can “guide discretion without being 
conclusive.” Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1180. In arriving at that 
conclusion, we again align with the reasoning of the majority 
of our sister circuits that have considered the issue. See McCoy, 
981 F.3d at 282 n.7; United States v. Tomes, 990 F.3d 500, 503 
n.1 (6th Cir. 2021); Gunn, 980 F.3d at 1180; Aruda, 993 F.3d 
at 802. But see Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 392. 
2 
The District Court also did not err when it concluded 
that the duration of Andrews’s sentence and the nonretroactive 
changes to mandatory minimums could not be extraordinary 




We begin with the length of Andrews’s sentence. The 
duration of a lawfully imposed sentence does not create an 
extraordinary or compelling circumstance. “[T]here is nothing 
‘extraordinary’ about leaving untouched the exact penalties 
that Congress prescribed and that a district court imposed for 
particular violations of a statute.” United States v. Thacker, 4 
F.4th 569, 574 (7th Cir. 2021). “Indeed, the imposition of a 
sentence that was not only permissible but statutorily required 
at the time is neither an extraordinary nor a compelling reason 
to now reduce that same sentence.” United States v. Maumau, 
993 F.3d 821, 838 (10th Cir. 2021) (Tymkovich, C.J., 
concurring). Moreover, considering the length of a statutorily 
mandated sentence as a reason for modifying a sentence would 
infringe on Congress’s authority to set penalties. See Gore v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (“Whatever views 
may be entertained regarding severity of punishment, whether 
one believes in its efficacy or its futility, these are peculiarly 
questions of legislative policy.” (citation omitted)). 
The nonretroactive changes to the § 924(c) mandatory 
minimums also cannot be a basis for compassionate release. In 
passing the First Step Act, Congress specifically decided that 
the changes to the § 924(c) mandatory minimums would not 
apply to people who had already been sentenced. See First Step 
Act § 403(b). That is conventional: “[I]n federal sentencing the 
ordinary practice is to apply new penalties to defendants not 
yet sentenced, while withholding that change from defendants 
already sentenced.” Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 280 
(2012). “What the Supreme Court views as the ‘ordinary 
practice’ cannot also be an ‘extraordinary and compelling 
reason’ to deviate from that practice.” United States v. Wills, 
997 F.3d 685, 688 (6th Cir. 2021). Interpreting the First Step 




statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read 
in their context and with a view to their place in the overall 
statutory scheme.” Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 
320 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 
(2000)). And when interpreting statutes, we work to “fit, if 
possible, all parts” into a “harmonious whole.” Brown & 
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959)). 
Thus, we will not construe Congress’s nonretroactivity 
directive as simultaneously creating an extraordinary and 
compelling reason for early release. Such an interpretation 
would sow conflict within the statute. See United States v. 
Jarvis, 999 F.3d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 2021) (“Why would the 
same Congress that specifically decided to make these 
sentencing reductions non-retroactive in 2018 somehow mean 
to use a general sentencing statute from 1984 to unscramble 
that approach?”). 
We join the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in reaching this 
conclusion. See Jarvis, 999 F.3d at 444–46; Thacker, 4 F.4th 
at 576; see also United States v. Loggins, 966 F.3d 891, 892–
93 (8th Cir. 2020) (district court did not misstate the law in 
finding “that a non-retroactive change in law did not support a 
finding of extraordinary or compelling reasons for release”). 
But see McGee, 992 F.3d at 1048 (a nonretroactive change to 
mandatory minimums cannot, by itself, create extraordinary 
and compelling circumstances; but nonretroactive changes 
may be paired with other unique circumstances to create 
extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence 
reduction); McCoy, 981 F.3d at 286 (nonretroactive changes to 
mandatory minimums may create extraordinary and 




required sentence or Congress’s nonretroactive sentencing 
reductions are not extraordinary and compelling reasons for 
purposes of § 3582(c)(1)(A), we are not saying that they are 
always irrelevant to the sentence-reduction inquiry. If a 
prisoner successfully shows extraordinary and compelling 
circumstances, the current sentencing landscape may be a 
legitimate consideration for courts at the next step of the 
analysis when they weigh the § 3553(a) factors. See Jarvis, 999 
F.3d at 445; Thacker, 4 F.4th at 575–76. 
C 
 Finally, we consider whether the District Court abused 
its discretion in determining that Andrews’s four remaining 
reasons fell short of the extraordinary-and-compelling 
requirement. Because the court carefully considered the 
remaining reasons and arrived at a reasoned result, we 
conclude that the court operated well within its discretion. 
The court recognized that Andrews was arrested at a 
relatively young age and that, since that time, he has taken 
great strides in his rehabilitation—he regularly attends church, 
he’s had a clean disciplinary record in prison since 2013, and 
he helped develop a charitable program to benefit the Salvation 
Army. Andrews, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 687. But the court ruled 
that Andrews’s other two proposed reasons—the government’s 
decision to charge him with thirteen firearm counts and his 
susceptibility to COVID-19—weighed against him because he 
presented no facts showing that prosecutors abused their 
discretion and he provided insufficient details about his 
susceptibility to COVID-19. Id. at 686. The court then 
explained that, although Andrews’s age and rehabilitation 
could both be viewed as extraordinary, those reasons by 




reduced sentence. Id. at 687–88. Thus, the court denied 
Andrews’s motion for compassionate release. Id. at 688. 
Courts wield considerable discretion in compassionate-
release cases, and we will not disturb a court’s determination 
unless we are left with a “definite and firm conviction that [it] 
committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it 
reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Pawlowski, 
967 F.3d at 330 (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Oddi, 234 F.3d at 146). We discern no 
clear error of judgment here. 
* * * 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order denying Andrews’s motion for compassionate 
release. 
